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  U.S. environmental regulations often vary by the size of the operation, with larger 
operations facing more regulatory stringency.  When the size distribution of firms is 
heavily skewed, regulation size thresholds can reduce transaction costs for regulatory 
agencies while bringing most production within a regulatory framework.  However, size-
based regulation may have unintended consequences if operations downsize, slow their 
growth, or enter at a smaller size in order to avoid regulation.  These unintended 
consequences from regulation may include less pollution abatement and diminished 
economic efficiency.  In this study we examine recently revised Clean Water Act (CWA) 
regulations targeting large-scale livestock operations to identify and quantify farm 
responses to this regulation.  We find statistical evidence that farms adjust size in order to 
avoid regulation.  Additionally farms in states with relatively higher costs of regulatory 
compliance experience on average 23% less growth than comparable farms in other 
states, net of prior state-level trends in growth.  In these states, regulated farms also 
experience a 5.8% greater chance of exit. 
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  U.S. environmental regulations often vary by the size of the operation, with larger 
operations facing more regulatory pressure.  Such size-based regulation may have 
unintended effects if operations downsize to avoid regulation or more small operations 
proliferate in industries with trends towards larger operations.  These unintended effects 
may have consequences for pollution reduction and economic efficiency.  Environmental 
regulation of livestock operations is a topic of particular recent importance.  
Domestically, the livestock and poultry industry produces over $100 billion dollars in 
cash receipts
1 and supplies 90% of the country’s red meat and 97% of the country’s dairy 
products.
2  This industry has also been found to be one of the top contributors to water 
pollution (EPA, 2002a) and a significant contributor of lower atmospheric air pollutants 
and greenhouse gases (see NRC, 2003).  The water pollution is a well-known issue in 
many rural communities, and has recently become more widely recognized in the 
mainstream media through documentaries like Food, Inc. (2009), Time Magazine’s cover 
story “The Real Cost of Cheap Food” (Walsh, 2009), and Michael Pollan’s book The 
Omnivore’s Dilemma (2006).  This pollution has also led to more stringent Clean Water 
Act (CWA) legislation in 2003 (EPA, 2003), as well as possible future Clean Air Act 
stipulations (see GAO, 2008) and greenhouse gas emissions regulation.
3  Understanding 
the past effects of environmental regulation on the industry is important given this 
regulatory context and the potential impact of future legislation on farm structure, the 
                                                 
1USDA Briefing Room: Animal Production and Marketing Issues.  
http://www.ers.usda.gov/Briefing/AnimalProducts/.  Accessed March, 2010. 
2 Statistics from 2000-2005.  Jerardo (2008). 
3 In Dec. 2009 the EPA published in the Federal Register an “Endangerment and Cause or Contribute” 
statement for greenhouse gases.  This stated that greenhouse gases including methane are a threat to public 
health; this is the first step in getting the ability to regulate such gases under the Clean Air Act.  While the 
statement specifically pertained to automobile emissions, the livestock industry (particularly dairies) 
reacted with concern to this finding, believing it paved the way to regulate methane emissions from 
livestock operations (see, for example, Dairy Cares 2009). 2 
 
price of food and the environment.   
  In this article we examine recently revised CWA regulations targeting large-scale 
livestock operations to identify and quantify firm decisions with respect to environmental 
regulation.  Evolving from findings that agriculture is a significant contributor to water 
pollution in the U.S. (EPA, 2002a), in 2003 the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) 
amended the CWA provisions related to “concentrated animal feeding operations” 
(CAFOs; the regulatory term for large-scale confined livestock operations).  The “2003 
CAFO Rule” effectively mandated all large-scale livestock operations to obtain permits 
and to institute land-dependent manure management plans, significantly strengthening 
prior 1972 regulations.   
An important feature of the 2003 Rule is its size-based stipulations whereby 
operations over a specific number of head automatically fall under regulatory purview.
4  
Thus operations face differential costs of compliance according to size, which in turn 
may have implications for growth, entry, and exit.  Understanding the role of regulations 
in industry structure and growth is necessary to devise accurate predictions of 
regulation’s environmental benefits as well as to comprehend any loss of scale 
efficiencies and social welfare. 
Understanding how operations react to regulation also allows us to understand the 
compliance costs.  Given that the prescribed abatement activities in agriculture are often 
“best management practices” rather than pollution control mechanisms like filters or 
scrubbers, there are substantial challenges in estimating the farm-level costs of 
regulation.  Estimating firms’ reactions to regulations can therefore provide estimates of 
the expected costs of regulation, which are useful in designing programs to offset 
                                                 
4 See Appendix A for a full description of the regulatory stipulations. 3 
 
regulation costs to firms.    
  We use individual farm-level data linked between the 1997, 2002, and 2007 U.S. 
Censuses of Agriculture to discern exits, entries, and growth.  We first focus on 
operations of sizes just below the regulatory cut-off to exploit regulatory size stipulations 
and provide evidence of non-zero costs of compliance.  We test whether these farms 
make up a statistically unlikely proportion of the distribution of farms and new entries 
after regulation, given pre-regulation population characteristics.  Further tests of growth 
of firms with respect to the regulatory cut-off also allow us to estimate how firms with 
sunk costs may react to regulation differently from new farms.   
 While examination of farms near the regulatory size threshold can provide an 
indication of expected costs of regulation, they only make up a small percentage of 
overall production.  Estimating effects of regulation on firms of size classes not near the 
cut-off requires cross-sectional and over-time variation in regulation.  While we can 
compile information on state timing and adoption of facets of the updated CWA rules 
(i.e. “what’s on the books”), we lack information on enforcement activity which could 
contribute to how operations react to regulation.  We therefore use the heterogeneity 
across states and over time identified in the prior analyses to test for impacts on size 
classes further away from the regulatory cut-off. 
We find that after the announcement of the initial 2003 CAFO Rule, 4.6%-7.6% 
of potentially regulated firms “avoid” it by remaining at sizes just below the regulatory 
cut-off.  There is heterogeneity across states, with the strongest evidence for avoidance in 
Iowa, Minnesota, Missouri, and North Carolina.  We use this avoidance as an indication 
of change in relative costliness of regulation, and estimate effects on entry, growth, and 4 
 
exit.  After regulation, entry is less likely in size classes just above the regulatory cut-off 
in states that increase regulatory costliness compared to changes in states that do not 
become more stringent.  Farms in states with higher expected costs of regulation see 28% 
less growth as measured by size, compared to pre-regulation trends in these same states 
and trends in states with lower regulation costs.  Farms above the regulatory cut-off in the 
states with higher costs of regulation have a 5.8% higher likelihood of exit compared to 
farms of the same size in other states, net of prior trends. 
 
Background 
Livestock agriculture has increasingly moved to industrial-scale operations with 
thousands of animals raised in a relatively small amount of space.  With the increasing 
spatial and farm-level disaggregation between crop and livestock production, there is less 
on-farm utilization of manure by livestock operations.  Compared to manure, chemical 
fertilizers are less costly to transport and apply and have better nutrient consistency 
which enables facilities to adjust its nutrients to plant requirements.  Livestock manure 
has therefore become a less valuable byproduct in many regions which creates an 
incentive for livestock producers to apply it to crops at rates in excess of what plants can 
absorb.  When operators apply manure above non-agronomic rates, precipitation may 
then carry land-applied manure to water bodies.  Additionally, liquid manure storage 
facilities can leak or overflow.  Effects of water pollutants from livestock farms include 
coastal dead zones, fish kills, impaired drinking water supplies, and adverse public health 
outcomes (Copeland, 2006). 
  The EPA first attempted to address pollution problems from livestock facilities by 5 
 
deeming large production operations as “point sources” of pollution and regulating them 
under the 1976 Clean Water Act (CWA).  In regulatory parlance, “point sources” are 
those that have an easily identifiable origin; preventing point source pollution is akin to 
plugging a pipe from which pollution spills.  Stipulations pertaining to CAFOs required 
specific waste management strategies and engineering requirements so that manure 
storage containers would not overflow except in the event of a major storm.  However, 
the only facilities that were required to apply for a permit were ones that had already had 
a documented “discharge” to a water of the U.S.; facilities that would only discharge in 
the event of a major storm did not need to seek permit coverage, and could avoid 
regulation altogether.  Enforcement was devolved to the states, which also adopted their 
own regulations of livestock operations (GAO, 2003). 
By the late 1990s the EPA concluded that the 1972 CWA rules (and subsequent 
amendments) did not satisfactorily prevent pollution from livestock operations.   In part 
this was due to unregulated “nonpoint source” pollution associated with livestock.  
“Nonpoint sources” have a less easily identifiable pollution source that can be controlled; 
in terms of livestock nonpoint source pollution arises when manure is spread on land and 
then carried to surface water via precipitation. In the late 1990s the EPA responded to a 
court-order to review and update their CAFO rules (Copeland, 2006).  In 2002 the first 
set of revised regulations were announced, and the next year these were adopted.   
The “2003 CAFO Rule” attempted to address at least two of the issues with prior 
regulations (EPA, 2003).  The first new stipulation required all livestock operations 
having an inventory above a specific number of head to seek coverage under a permit; 
this “duty to apply” meant that the regulatory authority could deem whether operations 6 
 
needed to adopt the stipulations required for a permit, rather than the facility itself stating 
that it would only discharge in the event of a major storm.  For example, operations with 
2,500 or more hogs each weighing 55lbs. or more automatically fell under regulatory 
purview based on size (EPA, 2003).  The second new stipulation attempted to address 
nonpoint source pollution by requiring CAFOs to implement “Comprehensive Nutrient 
Management Plans” (CNMPs), requiring operations to land-apply manure at rates 
appropriate for the soil type and crops planted.  For certain operations, this would mean 
renting or buying additional land on which to apply manure, or transporting manure off-
farm.  However, the low demand for manure by crop farms and the high cost of 
transporting manure meant that certain farms would face higher compliance costs than 
others. 
Both industry and environmental groups found issue with the revised CAFO rules, 
and sued the EPA (Centner, 2008).  In 2008 updated rules were adopted and adjusted for 
court outcomes.  The 2008 rules removed the requirement that all CAFOs had to apply 
for permits with the regulatory authority but strengthened the stipulations regarding 
nutrient management (EPA, 2008a).     
As the EPA began modifying its original CWA regulations of CAFOs, many 
states also began to revamp their environmental regulations of livestock (EPA, 2002b).  
Several states adopted new permitting rules for CAFOs in the late 1990s and early 2000s 
or strengthened their existing plans.  While Federal CWA regulations aim to set a “lower 
bound” on the stringency of CAFO point-source regulations, there has been and 
continues to be wide variation between states with regards to implementation (GAO, 
2003).  For example, while Michigan obtained permission in 1973 from the EPA to run 7 
 
its permitting program, the EPA later had to sue the state to enforce the regulations, as 
Michigan had relied on the concept that farmers would abide by “best management 
practices” and did not need to seek permit coverage. Michigan adopted a permitting 
program in 2002 (GAO, 2006). 
  The impact of environmental regulation’s effects on agriculture is relatively 
understudied, with most analyses focusing on the association between regulatory 
stringency and location.  In panel analysis, Sneeringer (2010; 2009) finds that North 
Carolina and California regulations are significantly associated the growth and regional 
variation in hog production and dairying in those states, respectively.  Roe, Irwin, and 
Sharpe (2002) and Isik (2004) find that relative state-level cross-sectional variation in 
recorded environmental regulatory stringency is strongly correlated with location of hog 
production facilities and dairies.   
  The empirical literature has not addressed the effect of environmental regulations 
on growth, entry, exit, and livestock industry structure.  In contrast, research on other 
industries has addressed firm responses to both domestic and international pollution laws.  
For example, Becker and Henderson (2000) use time- and county-variation in Clean Air 
Act (CAA) ozone regulation status to estimate effects on polluting manufacturing 
industries.  They find relatively more growth in smaller-scale, less-regulated firms as well 
as the prolonging of firm investment decisions until after regulation is certain.   
  Another feature of the literature on environmental regulation’s interactions with 
industry is the study of abatement costs or costs associated with regulatory compliance.  
This literature has benefited from data from the Pollution Abatement Control 
Expenditures Survey which specifically asks about abatement expenditures (e.g., Berman 8 
 
and Bui, 2001).  The difference for the livestock industry is that abatement methods are 
not “add-ons” to normal operation; rather, they are usually practices that are already 
performed.  For example, land application of manure is regularly performed to fertilize 
crops; CNMP requirements govern how much manure can be applied to which land.  
Thus it is difficult to discern what costs of this manure application are related to 
regulation, and which would have been borne regardless of regulation, even if one knows 
whether or not the operation falls under regulatory purview.  While pre-regulation studies 
have calculated predicted compliance costs (Ribaudo et al., 2003), no research has 
attempted to estimate these costs based on observed producer behavior. 
  Our first goal is therefore to model expected regulatory costs.  Next, we make 
predictions of firm behavior given compliance cost structures.  We then test our 
predictions.  This not only allows us to understand firm decisions under regulation, but 
also the structure of regulatory compliance costs.  Our empirical strategy first focuses on 
firm sizes just around the regulatory cut-off; we then examine operations of other sizes. 
 
Model of Expected Regulatory Compliance Costs 
This section presents a model of producers’ scale of production decision under 
environmental regulation.  Let  m L  refer to the cut-off over which firms are regulated, 
where  L denotes number of head. Also let  ) ( 1 L  be profits before regulation, where 
0 ) 0 ( 1 ,  0 ) ( 1 L , and  0 ) ( 1 L ; the increasing profits with respect to number of 
livestock operations reflects increasing returns to scale found in the livestock sector (Key, 
McBride, and Mosheim, 2008).  The post-regulation optimization decision is:  9 
 
(1) 
L L t s
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where  ) (L r is the expected cost of regulation imposed if the firm is above the size 
threshold and   is the maximum attainable size.
 5   
The expected regulatory cost  ) (L r  depends on whether or not firms comply with 
the regulation.  They will choose to comply if the costs of compliance are less than the 
expected fines associated with non-compliance.  Let  ) (L g be the costs of compliance and 
let these cost increase with scale at an increasing rate to account for the likelihood that 
manure disposal will become more difficult with scale, i.e.,  0 ) (L g  and  0 ) (L g .  
Profits with compliance are therefore: ) ( ) ( 1 2 L g L L . 
The other option for producers is not to comply with the regulation and face 
possible penalties.  Let P  be the probability of detection and  ) (L F be the fine that 
producers must pay if detected.  We model fines as a function of size, although 
probability of detection may also increase with size.  Non-complying producers have 
expected profits equal to ) ( ) ( ) ( 1 2 L PF L E . 
A producer of size L who is subject to regulation therefore chooses the minimum 
of compliance costs and expected fine from detection:   
(2) 





min ) (  
Note that if producers perceive probability of detection as zero due to lack of 
enforcement, then there will be no compliance and expected cost of regulation will be 
                                                 
5 We assume for the current range of producer sizes that  0 ) ( ) ( 1 L r L .  Above the size L at which
0 ) ( ) ( 1 L r L  it would not be profitable to operate.  10 
 
zero. 
Figure 1 illustrates producers’ scale decision for the case where there are positive 
expected regulatory costs at  m L such that  ) ( ) ( 2 1 m m (where   is some 
marginal amount greater than zero).  Note that, with some probability of enforcement, 
0 ) (m r  because under regulation a producer will need to use all manure at agronomic 
rates, rather than just the manure from the
th m head.  Given the gap between  ) ( 1 m and 
) ( 2 m ,  there will be some size  x m at which  ) ( ) ( 1 2 m x m  and 
) ( ) ( 1 2 m x m , where  0 x .  For operations between mand  x m , it will be 
optimal to reduce size tom or grow to size  x m .  Further, profit- maximizing 
new entrants would not begin at sizes between mand  x m , nor would firms change 
sizes to between mand  x m .   
With this post-regulation profit function, producers may “avoid” regulation by 
shrinking or new firms may enter at a smaller size than they otherwise would have.  Note 
that avoidance is a form of compliance, not an illegal maneuver.  If the cost of 
complying, the probability of detection, or the fine associated with detection increases, 
we could expect a larger “unprofitable zone” and consequently a higher incidence of 
avoidance.   
We proceed by testing for an “unprofitable zone” indicative of non-zero “lump 
sum” regulatory costs at the cut-off point.  Once these have been tested for, we move to 
analyzing the expected regulation costs at other sizes.  Our tests for avoidance at the state 




  We use individual farm-level data from the U.S. Censuses of Agriculture for 
1997, 2002, and 2007 to examine the size characteristics of farms before and after 
regulations.  Access to these data is restricted to specific computer labs and requires an 
approval process through NASS.
6  We link farms across Censuses through the use of 
individual identification codes.    
Because EPA regulations are animal type specific and because states adopt 
different regulations by animal type, we focus only on hogs.  Additionally, the 2003 
CAFO Rule included stipulations specifically pertaining to operations with different sizes 
of hogs.  Thus there are different cut-off points for operations raising hogs that are 55lbs. 
and over as well as operations raising pigs that are under 55lbs.  Hog production has 
become increasingly more specialized, with different stages of growth occurring at 
different facilities; operations are therefore characterized by the stage(s) of growth that 
they perform.  The three major categories include “farrow-to-feeder,” “farrow-to-finish,” 
and “finish-only.”  Finish-only operations will have hogs that are all at least 55lbs. each, 
while farrow-to-feeder operations will have mostly piglets under 55lbs.  Farrow-to-feeder 
operations will include hogs both over and under 55lbs.  We therefore focus on farms 
growing hogs to market weight, and include in our analysis just “finish only” operations.  
This type of operation can be straightforwardly characterized in the 2002 and 2007 
Censuses but the question is not asked in 1997.  In 1997, we characterize finish hog farms 
as those with no breeding hogs, no sales of feeder pigs, and no litters farrowed (see 
Appendix B for details).  We restrict analysis in all years to just operations that had any 
                                                 
6 For more information see http://www.agcensus.usda.gov. 12 
 
hog sales or removals,
7 have no breeding hogs which might indicate the presence of 
under 55lb. piglets, and have at least 100 hogs in inventory; see Appendix B for further 
data description.  Entering and exiting farms are characterized by matching farms over 
time according to unique Census identifiers.  Table 1 shows basic summary statistics for 
these farms over time; as is evident, the number of farms decreases while the mean and 
median number of hogs per farm increases.   
 
Empirical Strategy 
We first test for evidence of a expected regulatory cost at the cut-off point; this focuses 
on size classes directly around the regulatory cut-off.  We then estimate effects on 
growth, entry, and exit at other sizes; this amounts to estimating expected regulatory 
costs that vary with size. 
Testing for evidence of non-zero regulatory costs at the cut-off 
We test for evidence of expected non-zero regulatory costs at the cut-off through three 
methods.  Due to lack of information on costliness of compliance, enforcement, and 
relative stringency at the state level even with knowledge of what is “on the books,” we 
begin by using the entire sample of all states to estimate effects related to the regulatory 
cut-off.   We calculate the percentage of operations by year for each of K equal 100-head 
size classes ( k N % ).
8  The regulatory cut-off is at 2,500 head, so the size class of 
                                                 
7 Hogs can be sold or “removed” from an operation depending on the farm’s marketing strategy.  
Contractors are said to “remove” hogs from growers with whom they have contracts.  While these growers 
receive some amount for the hogs, the process is known as “removal” not sales.  Independent growers not 
in production contracts, on the other hand, are said to “sell” their hogs. 
8 For this analysis we exclude operations of size classes above 10,000 because our focus is on accurately 
estimating the distribution around the regulatory cut-off.  Additionally, 100-head size classes above 10,000 
become increasingly more likely to have no observations; this also hurts the ability to accurately estimate 
the distribution. 13 
 
particular interest is 2,400-2,499. This analysis is partially complicated by the fact that 
between 1997 and 2007 a 1,200 barn size became increasing common;
9 hence farm sizes 
that are multiples of 1,200 become greater portions of the overall population.  We later 
consider why this particular barn size has been adopted as a standard in the industry, but 
for the present analysis we must make adjustments for farm sizes that are multiples of 
1,200, including the pertinent one of 2,400. To estimate whether 2,400-2,499 farms make 
up a statistically unlikely portion of the distribution, we drop size classes that are 
multiples of 1,200 as well as those that are multiples of 500 and/or 1,000 and fit an Nth 





k k k e S N
1
% . 
Here,  k N % refers to the percentage of observations in bin k  and  k S refers to the midpoint 
of bin.  We choose the functional form by adding polynomials up to 20 degrees to 
maximize the adjusted R-squared with the additional stipulation that each additional 
polynomial increases the F-statistic by at least 0.5.  We estimate this functional form for 
the distribution separately for each year.  
  We next predict the percentage of observations ( k P % ) in each of the size classes 
and estimate the standard deviation of the prediction ( P ) using the least-squares 
parameters from (3).  With this we compute the number of standard deviations the 
predicted percent is from the observed percent.  The test statistic with  k N %  equal to the 
                                                 
9 A 1,200 head hog barn is often mentioned in the literature as a typical size for a modern facility.  For 
example, a report from Iowa State University (Lammers et al., 2009)  states , “Conventional confinement 
facilities are typical of pork industry practice in the United States and are characterized by individual 
gestation stalls and 1,200 head grow-finish buildings with slatted concrete floors and liquid manure 
systems” (p. 1). 14 
 









has a t-distribution with K – (M + 1) degrees of freedom, where K is the number of bins 
(the sample size) and M + 1 is the number of parameters in the polynomial regression.
10 
If barn sizes that are multiples of 1,200 are standard, then we should see the 
percentage of farms of these sizes to be greater than what would be predicted with the 
above regression.  To test for evidence of avoidance, we compare the test statistics for 
multiples of 1,200 that are not 2,400 with the test statistic for the 2,400-2,499 size class.  
The test statistics for size classes 1,200, 3,600, 4,800 and so forth therefore become the 
“lower bound” on what we accept as evidence of a statistically unlikely percentage of 
farms in the “just below” size class.  Further, we perform this cross-sectional test for the 
periods before regulation (1997, 2002) and compare this to the period after regulation 
(2007).
11   
  Using the predicted percentages from the above analysis, we calculate the 
percentage of farms that “avoid” regulation by being in the size class just below the 
regulatory cut-off ( A % ) as: 
(4)  400 , 2 400 , 2 % % % k k P N A  
We also estimate an avoidance percentage that adjusts for the standard nature of the 
1,200 size class (
adj A % ) through the following: 
                                                 
10 See for example, Johnston (1984, p.193-198) for a derivation of (4). 
11 We do not group all periods together in our regressions because we want to allow for distribution 
changes across time unrelated to regulation.  In order to allow for distribution changes while pooling all 
years we would need to interact each year’s estimated distribution with an indicator for the year; hence no 
additional information or power would be gained from pooling. 15 
 
(5)  ) % % % (%
2
1
% % % 600 , 3 600 , 3 200 , 1 200 , 1 400 , 2 400 , 2 k k k k k k
adj P N P N P N A  
Further, we calculate a “1,200-multiple-adjusted” test statistic of 
(6)  ) (
2
1
600 , 3 200 , 1 400 , 2 400 , 2 k k k
adj
k t t t t  
We perform a similar type of analysis for new entries, using entries between 1997 and 
2002, and between 2002 and 2007.  Finally, using the percentage of firms above the 

















These rates provide estimates of the total number of potentially regulated firms that avoid 
regulation. 
Computing indicators of state-level regulatory costs over time 
  To derive an indicator of these regulatory costs we examine the change in the 
number of farms near the regulatory threshold.  Firms just above and below the threshold 
are most likely to experience distinct differences in compliance costs associated with 
small changes in size, and are therefore most likely to manifest observable changes in 
behavior in response to increased regulation.  Consequently findings of firm adjustments 
in sizes near this regulatory cut-off can serve as an indicator of regulatory stringency that 
can be used to examine the effects on firms in other size classes further from the cut-off.   
   Estimating whether the farm size distribution changes near the regulatory 
threshold requires a sufficient number of farms at the State level.  We therefore restrict 
the study to States with 100 or more finish-only operations in each Agricultural Census 
between 1997 and 2007.  These states are Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Michigan, 
Missouri, Minnesota, Nebraska, North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, and 16 
 
Wisconsin.   
Estimating distributional and entry effects on other size classes 
  We use the state- and time-level heterogeneity of expected regulatory costs from 
the procedure described above to estimate regulation’s effects on farms in other size 
classes.  Exploiting variation across states in relative regulatory costs enables us to 
control for fixed characteristics of states as well as time-specific features occurring across 
all observations.  We address entry, growth, and exit of farms, and use different analyses 
to address these firm decisions.  Unlike exits, for entries we do not have information on 
what the farms “would have been” had they not entered.  We therefore cannot perform 
farm-level analyses for effects of regulation on entries.  For entries, we therefore perform 
effects of regulation on entry by size, and we address growth and exits in individual farm-
level analyses. 
We first assess how regulation may affect the overall distribution of firm entry 
size by calculating the percentage of entering farms by state and year in each size class    
( kst N % ) and regressing this on interactions between dummy variables for each size class 
interacted with state regulation status ( st A ).  We then perform the following regression  
(8)  kst kt ks k k st kst e A N ) ( %  
The size-bin-year fixed effects ktwill account for uniform shifts across all states during a 
specific time period (like a national trend toward a more skewed distribution).  The bin-
state fixed effects kswill control the “average distribution” within a particular state that is 
constant over time.  The coefficients  kprovide the change in the percentage of 
observations of an individual size correlated with regulation, controlling for changes 
post-regulation in unregulated states. 17 
 
In our next set of analyses, we examine firm-level growth and exit; this requires 
information on each farm in at least two Census years.  Growth is estimated by the 
change in an individual farm between one year and the next.  Exit is characterized by 
whether the farm exits in the next time period.  Our empirical strategy is akin to the now 
common differences-in-differences approach. We restrict our sample to all farms with 
observations in at least two Census years;
12 with these we calculate change across two 
periods (indexed  p ; the two periods are 1997-2002 and 2002-2007) and regress: 
isp p s isp sp isp e X A L ) (  
Where  ist L refers to the change in the outcome variable for farm i in state sand period 
p .  For growth, we explore the percentage and level changes in farm size; for exit, the 
outcome variable refers to a dummy variable equal to one if the firm exited in the time 
period and zero otherwise.  We also include potential farm- and time-varying 
confounding variables ( isp X ) that may be correlated both with relative regulatory 
stringency and the outcome variable.  We use levels in the beginning year of the period 
(i.e., 1997 or 2002) of these variables, including operator age and experience and the total 
number of acres on the operation; this considers these variables as “inputs” to the 
eventual outcome.  With size change as the outcome variable, we estimate effects using 
ordinary least squares. With exit indicator as the outcome variable, a probit model is 
estimated using a maximum likelihood procedure.
13  To account for potential 
heteroscedasticity in error terms, we cluster them according to state and time period. 
                                                 
12 We do not restrict ourselves to farms with observations in all three years (1997, 2002, and 2007) because 
of how few farms fit this criterion. 
13 Lancaster (2000) notes that probit analysis with multiple fixed effects may lead to the “incidental 
parameters problem,” which is avoided in the linear probability model.  We therefore also estimate 
probability of exit using a linear probability model to test for robustness according to this functional form; 
results are shown in Appendix D. 18 
 
  The state and period fixed effects are pivotal for identifying effects associated 
with regulation.  State fixed effects will control for growth or probability of exit in the 
period before the regulation.  Thus even if states with faster growing operations are more 
likely to adopt and enforce regulation, this empirical strategy will control for this.  The 
time period fixed effects non-parametrically control for factors that affect all states in the 
time period.   
 
Results 
Effects of regulation on the likelihood of farms to be just under the regulatory cut-off 
Figures 1A, 1B, and 1C show the overall distribution of finish-only hog farms 
with at least 100 hogs in inventory and with at least one sale or removal in the year for 
1997, 2002, and 2007.
14  As is evident, a smaller percentage of farms occupy the smallest 
size classes over time as the distribution changes.  Also noticeable are the increasing 
frequency of mass points, generally at multiples of 500 and/or 1,000.   The regulatory 
cut-off of 2,500 head is shown; farms above this size automatically fall under “Large 
CAFO” status according to size.  Also evident is the increasing percentage of farms in the 
size class directly below the regulatory cut-off. 
Figures 2A, 2B, and 2C show the statistical test values for all size classes that are 
not multiples of 1,000 and/or 500.  The multiples of 1,200 are highlighted for illustration.  
Negative numbers suggest that there are fewer farms in the size range than would be 
expected given the overall distribution.  In 1997 the most statistically unlikely difference 
between the observed and the predicted size occurs for the size class 1,200-1,299, 
                                                 
14 Size classes 100-199 and 200-299 are not shown for illustrative purposes.  The right-most bin represents 
sizes of 10,000 head or more. 19 
 
evidence of the “standardness” of the 1,200-head barn.  By 2002, both the 1,200 and 
2,400 size classes appear statistically out-of-proportion to their predictions (Fig. 2B).  
However, in 2007 after the 2003 CAFO Rule has been announced, the test statistic for the 
size category just below the regulatory cut-off becomes much larger, suggesting that a 
statistically unlikely percentage of farms is of this size (Fig. 2C).  Table 2 provides the 
actual and predicted percentage of farms in three size classes that are multiples of 1,200.  
In all years, the test statistic suggests that the percentage of observations in each of these 
size classes is statistically unlikely given the rest of the distribution.  The percentage of 
farms in the “just-below” size class becomes greater in the post-regulation period, unlike 
the other two multiples of 1,200.  Further, the test statistic for the just-below size 
category rises markedly in the post-regulation period compared to the other two size 
classes.   
To summarize, we find evidence that a portion of farms avoid the 2003 CAFO 
Rule by entering or remaining at a size class directly below the regulatory cut-off.  This is 
the case even after adjusting for the fact that the “just-below” size class may be more 
probable due to the fact that it includes two 1,200-head barns, a barn size that is 
becoming more common over time. 
While some avoidance is likely occurring, its magnitude is also pertinent.  Table 3 
shows calculation of avoidance rates, with and without adjustment for the 1,200-head 
standard barn size.  In 2007 after the announcement of the 2003 CAFO Rule, avoidance 
occurs for one in 22 potentially regulated farms (an avoidance rate of 4.6%), accounting 
for the increased prevalence of the 1,200-head barn size.  Approximately 153 more farms 
would be regulated if they had not remained in or entered the 2,400-2,499 size class.  20 
 
Similar analyses to those above show a similar pattern for new entrants (Fig. 3A 
and 3B).  The percentage of new entries in the 2,400-2,499 size class is also statistically 
unlikely (Fig. 4A and 4B). 
State-Level Environmental Stringency 
  By performing the above analysis, we calculate the adjusted and non-adjusted test 
statistics by state and year (Table 4).  These numbers suggest variation in the timing and 
stringency of state regulation pertaining to the 2,500-head regulatory cut-off.  The states 
that have an adjusted test statistic that goes from insignificant or negative in 2002 (before 
the announcement of the 2003 CAFO Rule) to significant and positive in 2007 (after the 
announcement) include Iowa, Minnesota, Missouri, North Carolina, and Ohio.  Along 
with Wisconsin, Ohio went from showing evidence to higher costs to evidence of lower 
costs between 1997 and 2002.  Avoidance rates by state and year are shown in Appendix 
Table D1.   
Effects of Regulation on Farm Entry 
  Fig. 5 shows the estimated effects of regulation on the size distribution of new 
entrants, adjusting for national distributional change and “average” distributions within 
the state.  Regulation is correlated with a larger percentage of farms entering in size 
classes below the “large CAFO” regulatory cut-off, cut these correlations are not 
statistically significant.  The only size category with a lower percentage of entrants 
associated with regulation is 2,500-4,999.  New entrants are 3.1% less likely to be this 
size in regulated states after regulation.   However, this effect is only significant tat the 
11% level.   
Farm-Level Analysis of Growth and Exit 21 
 
  For the farm-level analysis, we use as a measure of state-level relative compliance 
costs the statistical significance of the adjusted test statistic.  Because we would like to 
compare states that exhibit similar properties in the “before regulation” period, we 
exclude from analysis Ohio and Wisconsin.  Our “treated” states move from no changes 
in the statistical significance of their regulatory costs between 1997 and 2002 to higher 
regulatory costs between 2002 and 2007; these include Iowa, Minnesota, Missouri, and 
North Carolina.  Our “control” states include Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Michigan, 
Nebraska, Pennsylvania, and South Dakota.  Tables 5 and 6 show summary statistics by 
treatment status over time.  Summary statistics for subsets of farms (i.e., continuing 
farms, new entrants) are also shown, pertinent for the different types of analyses 
conducted according to outcome variable. 
  Tables 7 and 8 show results for the growth regressions.  We show results not only 
for the overall sample, but samples according to size class at the start of the period.  This 
is to test for different effects according to size, as predicted by the theoretical model.  We 
also show results with and without including the potential confounders.  Using the sample 
of all continuing farms, increased regulatory costs are associated with a 23.3% to 27.9% 
decline in growth.  Examination by sizes associated with the different regulatory levels 
suggests that small farms below the regulatory cut-off exhibit declines in growth 
associated with regulation; this could be indicative of attempting to avoid the next largest 
size class.  Overall, regulated farms that begin above the 2,500-head threshold do not 
exhibit changes in growth associated with the regulation.  However, dividing large 
CAFOs between sizes of 2,500-4,999 and 5,000 and above shows that the largest farms 
exhibit declines of approximately 40% with costlier compliance.  The lack of a regulation 22 
 
effect for farms just above the regulatory cut-off (2,500-4,999) may be indicative of both 
growth and decline of farms in this category.  The theoretical model predicts that farms of 
size just above the regulatory cut-off will have an incentive to either decrease or increase 
in size if they wish to increase post-regulation profits.  Thus some firms of this size prior 
to regulation may grow and others may shrink, leading to no overall effect.
15  
Examination of level changes echoes many of the results found for percentage 
changes (Table 8).  The overall effect is statistically insignificant, but we find statistically 
significant negative effects for both sizes below 2,500 and sizes above 5,000.  The largest 
effects in terms of number of head occur for the largest operations.  Additionally, results 
are largely robust with respect to inclusion of the farm- and time- varying covariates. 
  Table 9 shows effects of relatively higher regulatory costs on probability of exit.  
When considering farms of all size classes, there is no statistically significant effect of 
regulation on exit.  Dividing by size suggests that this overall effect masks different 
effects at different sizes.  However, after controlling for covariates, there is a weakly 
significant (at the 10% level) higher probability of exit for farms in the “large CAFO” 
category.  The magnitude of this effect is approximately 5%.  Interestingly, regulation is 
also correlated a 5% decreased likelihood of exit for farms in the “medium CAFO” size 
category.  This may be indicative that regulation creates more favorable market outcomes 
for unregulated farms compared to regulated ones.
16 
                                                 
15As a robustness check, we exclude North Carolina and Indiana separately from the treatment and control 
groups, respectively.  North Carolina had a moratorium limiting new hog operations and the growth of 
existing hog operations in effect between 1997 and the present.  Because this feature is fixed for the state 
over the time period, it should be captured in the state fixed effect; nevertheless, we perform the robustness 
check, we results largely the same as those shown.  Indiana had a state-level regulatory cut-off of 600 head, 
suggesting that this state’s reaction to the 2003 CAFO Rule may have been different from other states.  
Again, results remain largely unchanged.    
16 Appendix Table D3 shows results from the linear probability model.  These are largely similar to those 
found in the probit model. 23 
 
 
Discussion and Conclusion 
  We find evidence that increased costliness of environmental regulation has an 
impact on the size, growth, and continuation of farms.  A statistically unlikely percentage 
of farms exist in the size category directly below where they would be designated as 
“Large CAFOs”.  This suggests that some farms avoid regulation by adjusting size.  This 
indicator of higher regulatory compliance costs is correlated with slower growth, even for 
farms that do not fall into the highest regulation category.  Higher regulatory costs are 
also correlated with a higher rate of exit for firms in the “large CAFO” category. 
  These findings are pertinent for a variety of policy questions.  In its estimates of 
the costs and benefits of the 2003 CAFO Rule, the EPA does not consider the changing 
distribution of farm sizes or the effects that the regulation may have on growth.  State-
level policy makers considering the stringency of their environmental regulations of 
livestock production may consider such effects as they weigh the benefits of such 
regulation against the costs.  Finally, these findings may inform private and public 
programs to help farms institute the more sustainable measures called for in regulation. 
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Notes for Fig. 1:  Percentages are of total number of finish-only hog farms; see Appendix B for description 
of farms.  Size classes 100-199 and 200-299 are excluded from figures for illustrative purposes.  Right-









Notes:  See text for description of test statistic.   
 





Notes for Fig. 3:  Percentages are of total number of finish-only hog farms; see Appendix B for description 
of farms.  Size classes 100-199 and 200-299 are excluded from figures for illustrative purposes.  Right-
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Table 1:  Summary Statistics for Finish-Only Hog Farms 
 
Year 
   1997  2002  2007 
Unweighted number of farms  13,549  10,159  9,386 
Weighted number of farms  14,649  11,020  10,232 
Mean number of hogs in inventory  1,186  1,906  2,640 
Median number of hogs in inventory  480  950  1,350 
Mean number of sales or removals  2,667  4,543  5,901 
Median number of sales or removals  800  2,011  3,000 
Mean size of new entrants  --  1,821  2,621 
Median size of new entrants  --  850  1,155 
Mean size of exiting farms  953  1,586  -- 
Median size of exiting farms  400  600  -- 
Notes:  Means and medians are weighted for non-response.  See Appendix B for 




Table 2:  Predicted and Actual Percentage of Finish-only Hog Farms of 
Sizes that are Multiples of 1,200; 1997, 2002, and 2007 
   
Year 
Farm size (head)  1997  2002  2007 
1,200-1,299 
     
 
Actual % of farms  2.1  3.3  3.2 
 
Predicted % of farms  1.1  1.8  1.8 
 
Std. dev. of prediction  0.2  0.3  0.3 
 
(Actual-Predicted)/Std. dev.  5.9  5.0  5.4 
2,400-2,499 
     
 
Actual % of farms  0.9  1.6  3.3 
 
Predicted % of farms  0.5  0.6  0.7 
 
Std. dev. of prediction  0.2  0.3  0.3 
 
(Actual-Predicted)/Std. dev.  2.8  3.3  9.9 
3,600-3,699 
     
 
Actual % of farms  0.6  1.1  1.3 
 
Predicted % of farms  0.2  0.4  0.5 
 
Std. dev. of prediction  0.2  0.3  0.3 
   (Actual-Predicted)/Std. dev.  2.3  2.2  2.8 
Notes:  Farms are defined in Appendix B.  See text for method of generating 
predictions. 
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Table 3:  Percentage of Finish-Only Hog Farms that "Avoid" Regulation Through Size 
Just Below Regulatory Cut-off 
   
Year 
   
1997  2002  2007 
Avoiders, not adjusting for 1,200 standard:  
     
 
% of overall number of farms   0.5%  1.0%  2.6% 
 
Number of farms  69  107  262 
Avoiders, adjusting for 1,200 standard:  
     
 
% of overall number of farms   -0.2%  -0.1%  1.5% 
 
Number of farms  -33  -11  153 
Farms with sizes over regulatory cut-off (non-avoiders) 
     
 
% of overall number of farms  12.2%  23.0%  31.1% 
 
Number of farms  1,794  2,537  3,179 
Avoidance rate 
     
 
Not adjusting for 1,200 standard  3.7%  4.0%  7.6% 
 
Adjusting for 1,200 standard  -1.9%  -0.4%  4.6% 
Statistical significance of avoidance (Test statistic value) 
   
 
Not adjusting for 1,200 standard  2.8  3.3  9.9 
   Adjusting for 1,200 standard  -1.3  -0.3  5.8 
Notes:  Avoidance rate = (# Avoiders) / (#Avoider + #Non-Avoiders).  See Appendix B for definition 
of farms.  "% of overall farms" refers to the percentage of the total number of finish-only hog 
farms as defined in the notes to Table 1.  See text for description of test statistic. 
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Table 4:  Test Statistic by State, With and Without Adjusted for 1,200 Barn Size; 1997, 
2002, and 2007 
 
Not Adjusted for 1,200 
Barn Size 
Adjusted for 1,200 Barn 
Size 
 
Year  Year 
State  1997  2002  2007  1997  2002  2007 
Illinois  1.5  0.4  3.0  1.3  -0.1  0.5 
Indiana  -0.2  -0.5  0.9  -0.6  -2.0  -0.4 
Iowa  0.8  1.8  9.2  -0.8  -0.4  5.6 
Kansas  -0.1  1.7  2.1  -1.0  1.3  0.1 
Michigan  0.5  2.3  2.0  0.3  1.8  0.9 
Minnesota  2.0  3.0  8.2  1.1  1.2  5.2 
Missouri  0.5  1.6  5.1  -1.2  1.8  5.0 
Nebraska  0.1  0.5  0.9  -0.9  -0.3  0.1 
North Carolina  5.7  6.7  7.2  1.2  0.6  2.2 
Ohio  1.0  3.6  4.5  2.5  1.4  4.2 
Pennsylvania  -0.2  -0.8  -0.5  -0.4  -0.8  -0.3 
South Dakota  0.5  -0.5  2.4  -2.4  -1.8  1.4 
Wisconsin  1.3  1.4  0.3  2.2  1.5  -0.4 
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Table 5:  Farm-Level Averages Before and After Announcement of 2003 CAFO Rule 
   
States indicating lower expected 
regulatory costs  
   
(IL, IN, KS, MI NE, PA, SD) 
      1997  2002  2007 
All operations 
     
 
N  4,215  2,959  2,639 
 
Operator age  47  49  51 
 
Operator experience  20  23  26 
 
Number of acres  661  794  854 
 
Number of hogs  683  1,227  1,801 
New entrants 




1,984  1,427 
 
Percentage new entrants 
 








23  25 
 
Number of acres 
 
806  800 
   Number of hogs     1,266  1,830 
   
States indicating higher expected 
regulatory costs  
   
(IA, MO, MN, NC) 
      1997  2002  2007 
All operations 
     
 
N  7,571  6,161  5,810 
 
Operator age  46  48  50 
 
Operator experience  18  21  24 
 
Number of acres  470  576  602 
 
Number of hogs  1,404  2,040  2,542 
New entrants 




3,724  2,726 
 
Percentage new entrants 
 








21  23 
 
Number of acres 
 
586  564 
   Number of hogs 
 
1,855  2,335 
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Table 6:  Farm-Level Averages Before and After Announcement of 2003 CAFO Rule 
   
States indicating lower expected 
regulatory costs  
   
(IL, IN, KS, MI NE, PA, SD) 
   
Before  After  Difference 
Continuing operations 
     
 
N  1,047  1,315  268 
 
Operator age  45  48  3 
 
Operator experience  20  22  3 
 
Number of acres  654  875  221 
 
Change in number of hogs  173  304  131 
 
Percentage change in hogs  46.7%  32.7%  -14.0% 
Exits plus continuing operations 
     
 
N  4,660  3,257  -1,403 
 
Operator age  47  49  2 
 
Operator experience  20  23  3 
 
Number of acres  661  794  133 
   Exit rate  77.5%  59.6%  -17.9% 
   
States indicating higher expected 
regulatory costs  
   
(IA, MO, MN, NC) 
   
Before  After  Difference 
Continuing operations 
     
 
N  2,539  3,253  714 
 
Operator age  44  47  3 
 
Operator experience  17  21  4 
 
Number of acres  492  607  115 
 
Change in number of hogs  371  478  107 
 
Percentage change in hogs  73.0%  36.9%  -36.1% 
Exits plus continuing operations 
     
 
N  8,085  6,634  -1,451 
 
Operator age  46  48  2 
 
Operator experience  18  21  3 
 
Number of acres  470  576  106 
   Exit rate  68.6%  51.0%  -17.6% 
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Table 7:  Regression Results for Effects of Regulation on Percentage Growth 










CAFOs  Large CAFOs 
Independent Variable  All  100-749  750-2499 
2500 and 
above  2500-4999 
5000 and 
above 
Regulation = 1  -0.233**  -0.529***  -0.114**  -0.0374  0.00364  -0.440*** 
 
(0.102)  (0.141)  (0.0508)  (0.0573)  (0.0659)  (0.0805) 
Time period fixed effects 
included?  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y 
State fixed effects included?  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y 










CAFOs  Large CAFOs 
Independent Variable  All  100-749  750-2499 
2500 and 
above  2500-4999 
5000 and 
above 
Regulation = 1  -0.279**  -0.609***  -0.102**  0.00110  0.0357  -0.397*** 
 
(0.104)  (0.160)  (0.0432)  (0.0628)  (0.0675)  (0.0689) 
Operator age  -0.00611*  -0.0209***  0.000518  -0.00263*  -0.00399**  0.00108 
 
(0.00304)  (0.00692)  (0.00629)  (0.00143)  (0.00184)  (0.00307) 
Years operations has been in 
existence  -0.00375  -0.00256  -0.00627  -0.00172  -0.00217  -0.00158 
 
(0.00268)  (0.0117)  (0.00698)  (0.00113)  (0.00128)  (0.00211) 
Total acres at the operation  1.85e-05  7.56e-05  4.40e-05**  1.44e-05  -8.22e-06  4.27e-05** 
 
(2.79e-05)  (8.02e-05)  (2.01e-05)  (1.04e-05)  (1.41e-05)  (2.01e-05) 
Time period fixed effects 
included?  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y 
State fixed effects included?  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y 
Observations  7,723  2,595  2,956  2,172  1,503  669 
Notes:  Observations are weighted according to the non-response adjustment weight in the beginning year of the period.  Standard 
errors are clustered according to the state-period.  Results of 12 regressions shown. 
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Table 8:  Regression Results for Effects of Regulation on Growth 










CAFOs  Large CAFOs 
Independent Variable  All  100-749  750-2499 
2500 and 
above  2500-4999 
5000 and 
above 
Regulation = 1  -22.42  -169.7***  -89.67  -185.9  56.53  -2,438*** 
 
(52.90)  (36.25)  (55.95)  (258.0)  (214.5)  (524.9) 
Time period fixed effects included?  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y 
State fixed effects included?  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y 










CAFOs  Large CAFOs 
Independent Variable  All  100-749  750-2499 
2500 and 
above  2500-4999 
5000 and 
above 
Regulation = 1  -0.636  -167.2***  -95.19**  -8.921  132.6  -1,886** 
 
(50.59)  (34.26)  (44.85)  (267.6)  (217.3)  (686.6) 
Operator age  7.299  -4.060*  3.648  17.93  -12.30*  75.17 
 
(11.38)  (2.335)  (8.782)  (24.05)  (6.239)  (82.30) 
Years operations has been in 
existence  -16.42  -1.033  -12.01  -34.47  -9.149*  -77.78 
 
(12.25)  (4.121)  (10.10)  (26.96)  (4.996)  (73.06) 
Total acres at the operation  0.113  0.0441  0.0629*  0.289  -0.0109  0.619 
 
(0.0693)  (0.0414)  (0.0353)  (0.180)  (0.0466)  (0.417) 
Time period fixed effects included?  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y 
State fixed effects included?  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y 
Observations  7,723  2,595  2,956  2,172  1,503  669 
Notes:  Observations are weighted according to the non-response adjustment weight in the beginning year of the period.  Standard 
errors are clustered according to the state-period.  Results of 12 regressions shown. 
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Table 9:  Regression Results for Effects of Regulation on Exit 









CAFOs  Large CAFOs 
Independent Variable  All  100-749  750-2499 
2500 and 
above  2500-4999 
5000 and 
above 
Regulation = 1  0.0159  0.0365**  -0.0402**  0.0493  0.0581  0.103 
 
(0.0178)  (0.0182)  (0.0204)  (0.0354)  (0.0498)  (0.101) 
Time period fixed effects 
included?  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y 
State fixed effects 
included?  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y 









CAFOs  Large CAFOs 
Independent Variable  All  100-749  750-2499 
2500 and 
above  2500-4999 
5000 and 
above 
Regulation = 1  0.00678  0.0311  -0.0509**  0.0576*  0.0792*  0.0673 
 
(0.0192)  (0.0192)  (0.0219)  (0.0334)  (0.0472)  (0.108) 
Operator age  0.00534***  0.00338***  0.00595***  0.00598***  0.00495***  0.00611*** 
 
(0.000440)  (0.000635)  (0.00111)  (0.00133)  (0.00123)  (0.00165) 
Years operations has 
been in existence  -0.00139**  -0.000620  -0.00228**  -0.00552***  -0.00453***  -0.00577*** 
 
(0.000574)  (0.000750)  (0.000918)  (0.000969)  (0.000856)  (0.00129) 
Total acres at the 
operation  -4.86e-05***  -3.08e-05***  -2.17e-05*  -2.29e-05*  -2.08e-05  -3.36e-05** 
 
(1.03e-05)  (1.13e-05)  (1.14e-05)  (1.23e-05)  (1.65e-05)  (1.63e-05) 
Time period fixed effects 
included?  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y 
State fixed effects 
included?  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y 
Observations  20,527  10,947  5,924  3,656  2,396  1,260 
Notes:  Observations are weighted according to the non-response adjustment weight in the beginning year of the period.  Standard errors are 
clustered according to the state-period.  Results of 12 regressions shown. i 
 
 
Appendix A:  Clean Water Act Regulation Pertaining to Hog Operations  
 
In the 1972 Clean Water Act (CWA), certain types of livestock operations of certain sizes 
with histories of discharging pollutants to federal waters were deemed “point sources” of 
pollution.  To fall under the original regulation’s purview, the operation first had to meet 
the following two stipulations: 
 
  Animals have been, are, or will be stabled or confined and fed or maintained for a 
total of 45 days or more in any 12-month period. 
 
  Crops, vegetation, forage growth, or post-harvest residues are not sustained in 
the normal growing season over any portion of the lot or facility. 
 
  [italicized portion directly quoted from GAO (2008), p. 61-62.] 
 
If a livestock operation displayed these two characteristics, it was deemed “animal 
feeding operations” (AFOs).  Only certain AFOs were regulated under the original CWA.     
AFOs were first characterized by number of animal units, where an “animal unit” 
represents approximately 1,000 pounds of live weight.  If an AFO had 1,000 or more 
animal units, it was automatically deemed a “concentrated animal feeding operation” 
(CAFO).  If an operation had between 300 and 999 animal units, it could also be deemed 
a CAFO if it satisfied one of the following two “discharge requirements”: 
 
  Discharged pollutants into federally regulated waters through a manmade ditch, 
flushing system, or similar manmade device. 
 
  Discharged pollutants directly into federally regulated waters that originate 
outside of and pass over, across, or through the facility or otherwise come into 
contact with animals confined in the operation.  
 
  [italicized portion directly quoted from GAO (2008), p. 61-62.] 
 
AFOs with 300-999 animal units could also be deemed CAFOs through discretion of the 
regulatory authority.  Finally, operations with fewer than 300 could be deemed CAFOs 
on a case-by-case basis. 
 
For hog, 1,000 animal units referred to 2,500 or more swine each weighing over 55 
pounds.  The medium size class covered 750-2,499 head each over 55 pounds.   
 
The 2003 CAFO Rule did not change the size class for hogs, but did add explicit rules for 
swine operations with hogs under 55 pounds. 
 
Once deemed a CAFO, an operation needed to obtain a National Pollution Discharge 
Elimination System (NPDES) permit.  To obtain this permit, a facility had to satisfying 
certain requirements with regards to manure storage.  Many of these stipulations ii 
 
remained largely unchanged with the 2003 CAFO Rule.  The two main changes for hog 
operations with swine above 55 pounds are described in the text. iii 
 




The regulatory cut-off points of the 2003 CAFO Rule pertain to the number of hogs of a 
certain weight at an individual farm (see Appendix A).  In order to accurately reflect the 
operations that would fall into the regulatory framework, we focus only on operations 
that are likely to have most hogs over the specific weight defined in the regulations.  
Since the Census of Agriculture does not contain information on the number of hogs of 
specific weights in inventory, we need to characterize such farms in another manner.  
Specifically, we focus on farms that are most likely to have head each weighing 55lbs. or 
more.  The type of operation where this is most likely to be the case is “finish only.”   
 
While farms are asked their type of operation in 2002 and 2007, we can straightforwardly 
characterize finish-only operations in these years.  Because the 1997 Census does not 
include a question on type of farm, we must devise a method to characterize likely finish-
only farms in that year.  Finish-only operations specialize in the last phase of hog growth, 
feeding hogs of 50lbs. and over to market weight around 250lbs.  They are therefore 
unlikely to have many hogs in inventory used for breeding.  Examining the percentage of 
the total inventory that is breeding hogs for the different types of operations (Appendix 
Table B1) confirms this statement.  In 2002 and 2007, less than 4% of inventory at self-
described “finish only” operations was in breeding hogs.  Further, more than 94% of 
these operations had no breeding hogs.  To characterize finish-only operations in 1997 we 
first eliminate farms with any breeding hogs in inventory; examination of other levels of 
breeding hog inventory suggest that nothing is gained by setting the limit at a higher 
percentage than zero.  As is evident in Appendix Table B1, nursery operations are also 
likely to have few breeding hogs.  For 1997 we therefore also eliminate farms that had 
any litters farrowed or with any sales or removals of feeder pigs (information not 
gathered in the 2002 and 2007 Censuses). 
 
Approximately 50% of the total number of finish-only hog farms have between 1 and 99 
hogs in inventory.  We exclude these farms from analysis for the following reasons.  
First, coverage is less complete for these smallest of hog farms; while the 2002 and 2007 
Censuses include coverage adjustment factors, the 1997 Census does not.  In order to be 
consistent over time, we therefore exclude these farms.  Second, our focus is on the 
reactions of farms to regulation; these smallest of farms are unlikely to experience 
changes related to regulation.  Third, farms with fewer than 100 head in inventory are 
unlikely to contribute a substantial portion to overall production. 
 iv 
 
To summarize, included farms are defined in the following manner:   
  2007:  Self-reported "finish only" operations with no breeding hogs, at least one 
sale or removal during 2007, and at least 100 hogs in inventory on Dec. 31, 2007 
  2002:  Self-reported "finish only" operations with no breeding hogs, at least one 
sale or removal during 2002, and at least 100 hogs in inventory on Dec. 31, 2002 
  1997:  Operations with no breeding hogs, no sales/removals of feeder pigs, no 
litters farrowed, at least one sale or removal during 1997, and at least 100 hogs in 
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Type of 
operation 








































Farrow to wean  46%  14%  18%  50%  11%  14% 
Farrow to finish  19%  22%  35%  22%  26%  37% 
Finish only  2%  95%  96%  4%  94%  94% 
Farrow to feeder  36%  19%  24%  40%  19%  23% 
Nursery  4%  91%  93%  5%  90%  91% 
Other  14%  73%  75%  18%  71%  73% 
Note:  This is for all farms that have at least one hog sale or removal in the year and at least one 




Appendix C:  The Problem of Characterizing State Regulation of Livestock 
Operations 
 
The EPA largely devolved the enforcement of the 1972 CWA to the states.  
Therefore, states could enact whatever level of stringency and oversight they deemed 
appropriate.  Further, states could adopt additional stipulations for livestock operations 
that were more stringent that those in the CWA.  An overview in 2002 reveals 
heterogeneity in state regulations (EPA, 2002). 
 
In addition to what is listed in state level regulations, there is also heterogeneity in 
enforcement.  A 1998 overview of application of state regulations reveals marked lack of 
enforcement of CAFO regulations in many states (NRDC, 1998).  In addition to poor 
state-level enforcement, the GAO has written reports critiquing the EPA’s oversight of 
states’ application of CAFO regulations (2003, 2008). 
 
In order to characterize the expected regulatory costs associated with state-level 
enforcement of CWA regulations, we estimate which states in which years have a 
statistically unlikely percentage of farms of size just below the regulatory cut-off of 2,500 
head.  As described in Appendix A, the federal CWA regulations of 1972 instituted a size 
class stipulation.  The 2003 CAFO Rule announced a “duty to apply” While we are 
specifically interested  
 
While one might expect that the announcement of the 2003 CAFO Rule would 
lead to a uniform application of the federal regulation across states, subsequent lawsuits 
contesting the 2003 Rule led to different timing of adoption across states.  vi 
 





Appendix Table D1:  Avoidance Rate by State, Adjusted and Not Adjusted for 
1,200 Barn Size; 1997, 2002, and 2007 
 
Not Adjusted for 1,200 
Barn Size 
Adjusted for 1,200 Barn 
Size 
 
Year  Year 
State  1997  2002  2007  1997  2002  2007 
Illinois  9.5%  1.0%  4.9%  7.9%  -0.3%  0.8% 
Indiana  -2.0%  -1.3%  2.2%  -8.1%  -5.9%  -1.1% 
Iowa  3.0%  3.8%  8.9%  -3.4%  -1.0%  5.6% 
Kansas  -1.1%  9.0%  7.5%  -9.8%  7.1%  0.5% 
Michigan  4.6%  9.6%  3.8%  3.4%  7.7%  1.8% 
Minnesota  9.4%  5.9%  9.5%  5.3%  2.3%  6.2% 
Missouri  1.6%  6.9%  15.3%  -4.5%  7.5%  15.2% 
Nebraska  1.3%  4.3%  4.3%  -11.6%  -3.4%  0.4% 
North Carolina  4.6%  5.3%  4.9%  1.0%  0.5%  1.5% 
Ohio  8.8%  18.5%  19.1%  19.9%  8.1%  18.0% 
Pennsylvania  -1.5%  -3.4%  -1.8%  -3.0%  -3.4%  -1.2% 
South Dakota  6.8%  -2.5%  11.9%  -47.7%  -9.8%  7.5% 
Wisconsin  15.1%  15.4%  4.0%  22.9%  17.1%  -5.4% 
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Appendix Table D2:  Predicted and Actual Percentage of New 
Entries of Finish-only Hog Farms of Sizes that are Multiples 
of 1,200;  2002 and 2007 
   
 Year 
Farm size (head)  2002  2007 
1,200-1,299 
   
 
Actual % of farms  3.5  3.2 
 
Predicted % of farms  1.7  1.6 
 
Std. dev. of prediction  0.2  0.2 
 
(Actual-Predicted)/Std.Dev.  8.1  6.9 
2,400-2,499 
   
 
Actual % of farms  1.3  3.6 
 
Predicted % of farms  0.6  0.7 
 
Std. dev. of prediction  0.2  0.2 
 
(Actual-Predicted)/Std.Dev.  3.3  12.8 
3,600-3,699 
   
 
Actual % of farms  0.9  0.9 
 
Predicted % of farms  0.4  0.5 
 
Std. dev. of prediction  0.2  0.2 
   (Actual-Predicted)/Std.Dev.  2.4  1.8 
Notes:  Farms are defined in Appendix B.  See text for method of 
generating predictions. 
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Appendix Table D3:  Regression Results for Effects of Regulation on Exit, Linear Probability Model 









CAFOs  Large CAFOs 
Independent Variable  All  100-749  750-2499 
2500 and 
above  2500-4999 
5000 and 
above 
Regulation = 1  0.00202  0.0337  -0.0402*  0.0520  0.0627  0.0781 
 
(0.0165)  (0.0205)  (0.0200)  (0.0349)  (0.0511)  (0.0771) 
Time period fixed effects 
included?  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y 
State fixed effects included?  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y 









CAFOs  Large CAFOs 
Independent Variable  All  100-749  750-2499 
2500 and 
above  2500-4999 
5000 and 
above 
Regulation = 1  -0.00506  0.0276  -0.0499**  0.0588*  0.0841*  0.0404 
 
(0.0171)  (0.0202)  (0.0215)  (0.0329)  (0.0487)  (0.0824) 
Operator age  0.00499***  0.00325***  0.00577***  0.00590***  0.00496***  0.00579*** 
 
(0.000468)  (0.000653)  (0.00105)  (0.00131)  (0.00122)  (0.00153) 
Years operations has been in 
existence  -0.00140**  -0.000641  -0.00221**  -0.00544***  -0.00456***  -0.00545*** 
 
(0.000527)  (0.000691)  (0.000886)  (0.000961)  (0.000850)  (0.00123) 
Total acres at the operation  -4.15e-05***  -2.69e-05***  -2.10e-05*  -2.19e-05*  -2.04e-05  -3.08e-05** 
 
(9.95e-06)  (9.14e-06)  (1.11e-05)  (1.11e-05)  (1.54e-05)  (1.46e-05) 
Time period fixed effects 
included?  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y 
State fixed effects included?  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y 
Observations  20,527  10,947  5,924  3,656  2,396  1,260 
Notes:  Observations are weighted according to the non-response adjustment weight in the beginning year of the period.  Standard 
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